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Abstract 
In two experiments, both employing deferred imitation, we studied the developmental 
origins of episodic memory in 2- to 3-year-old children by adopting a “minimalist” 
view of episodic memory based on its What-When-Where (“WWW”: spatiotemporal 
plus semantic) content.  We argued that the temporal element within spatiotemporal 
should be the order/simultaneity of the event elements, but that it is not clear whether 
the spatial content should be egocentric or allocentric. We also argued that episodic 
recollection should be configural (tending towards all-or-nothing recall of the WWW 
elements).  Our first deferred-imitation experiment, using a 2D display, produced 
superior-to-chance performance after 2.5 years but no evidence of configural memory. 
Moreover, performance did not differ from that on a What-What-What control task.  
Our second deferred-imitation study required the children to reproduce actions on an 
object in a room, thereby affording layout-based spatial cues. In this case, not only 
was there superior-to-chance performance after 2.5 years but memory was also 
configural at both ages. We discuss the importance of allocentric spatial cues in 
episodic recall in early proto-episodic memory and reflect on the possible role of 
hippocampal development in this process.  
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Pre-school children’s proto-episodic memory assessed by deferred imitation. 
1. “Minimal” episodic memory in animals and children 
Endel Tulving’s original definition of episodic memory was minimalist: “Episodic 
memory receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes or events, 
and temporal-spatial relations among these events” (Tulving, 1972, p. 385).  It was 
minimalist in the sense of making no reference to the possession of concepts or to 
consciousness, in contrast to Tulving’s later views (e.g., Tulving 2005).  This 
definition was interpreted by the comparative psychologists Nicola Clayton and 
Anthony Dickinson to mean that if an animal recalls “what” happened, “when” and 
“where” then it has fulfilled the original Tulving criteria.  Indeed they argued that a 
food-caching bird, the scrub jay, fulfils these criteria insofar as it remembers what 
kind of food was cached, how long ago, and where it was cached (Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1998). This became known as What-Where-When (or WWW) memory. 
The general assumptions behind the work were taken up by researchers on rat 
learning (Babb and Crystal, 2005; Eacott and Norman, 2004; Iordanova, Good, and 
Honey, 2008; Wright, 2013). 
 In an attempt to locate the above issues in relation to the early development of 
episodic memory in children Russell and Hanna (2012; Russell, 2014) made the 
following proposal. If there is a minimal WWW memory in young children then we 
should regard this as only a prefiguration of true episodic memory. This is because 
such a form of memory may be unaccompanied by the kind of conceptual capacities 
associated with adult episodic recall such as the concept of a unique, experienced 
event causing a present memory (McCormack & Hoerl, 2001; Perner, 2001). The 
term we shall be using for such WWW-memories is “proto-episodic.” The term is 
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needed to distinguish it from episodic recollection that the child knows to be such 
(hence Tulving’s, 2005, term “autonoesis”), which is likely to depend upon theory-of-
mind insights to some degree, and which seems to begin after 4 years (e.g., Perner & 
Ruffman, 1995; Perner, Kloo & Gornik, 2007). 
 The Clayton-Dickinson approach has its critics (e.g., Suddendorf & Busby, 
2003), but the criticisms pertinent to the present studies were voiced by Russell and 
Hanna (2012).  First, one can question the Clayton-Dickinson view of the temporal 
element (when = how long ago), given that there is no reason to believe that knowing 
how long ago an event took place is constitutive of episodic memory
1
. Second, and 
more generally, the Clayton-Dickinson interpretation of WWW is not based on any 
conceptual analysis of re-experiential memory. Russell and Hanna suggested that we 
should turn for this analysis to philosophy, and to Kantian philosophy in particular.  
From an analysis of the essential properties of a perceptual experience one can argue 
that if episodic memory is indeed re-experiential then it will inherit these properties.   
Kant (1781/1998) claimed that experience is essentially spatiotemporal –– this 
is the famous “a priori of space and time” ––– and in doing so took the temporal 
content to be the order or simultaneity of elements (things or actions) within an 
experience. Given this, if a memory is re-experiential then it should be the order or 
simultaneity of the actions or objects within the episode that will be recalled: these 
properties will be carried over from experience to re-experience.   
With regard to space, it is far from clear whether it is egocentric or allocentric 
space that is supposed to be central to experience, and thus to re-experience. Setting to 
                                                 
1
 The thought-experiment: You have a re-experiential memory for event E and know it was a unique 
autobiographical event, but cannot recall whether E took place last week or a month ago.  What warrant 
is there for denying that it is an episodic memory? The length of time between E and the present would 
appear to be a semantic matter.  
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one side the philosophical issue of what Kant meant, or should have meant, by the 
spatial claim, one can express the underlying ambiguity this way: because experience 
is inevitably from a point-of-view, egocentricity is suggested; whereas at the same 
time experience is typically taken to be of an objective spatial world, which would 
suggest allocentricity. In this paper whether egocentric or allocentric spatial content 
is utilised in young children’s episodic memory will be one of the central empirical 
questions to be addressed. 
The implications from the above position for researchers studying WWW are 
twofold: (a) the temporal element in WWW memory should be order/simultaneity of 
elements within the original event, and (b) whether the spatial content of the 
experience/re-experiential memory is allocentric or egocentric is an issue to be 
determined empirically.  However, there would seem be a third characteristic of 
WWW episodic memory that pertains not to the content of the re-experiential memory 
but to how the WWW elements are related.  The supposition is that they are related to 
one another holistically.  The next section explains claim. 
2. The putatively non-elemental nature of episodic memory 
We will argue, after Russell and Hanna (2012; Russell, 2014), that for WWW 
memory truly to be episodic the three components will tend to be recalled in all-or-
nothing fashion, rather than as independent elements, given that events are 
experienced “as a whole.”  We offer three considerations in favour of this view. 
In the first place, when Tulving originally drew the semantic-episodic 
distinction he wrote that  “Semantic memory is the memory necessary for the use of 
language” (Tulving, 1972, p. 386), going on to explain how it must have a language-
like format.  Next, the symbolic format underlying language would seem to require 
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the bringing of atoms of meaning into relation to produce molecular propositions.  
Accordingly, one can lay down a semantic trace of an event in other people by 
relating the event to them.  And it falls out from the nature of language itself that this 
can be done bit-by-bit –– elementally. Thus, if I relate an event to a friend I can say 
“It was a yellow van.” …“It was on my left.”… “It then signalled to turn right.”  By 
contrast, if the friend was with me at the time of the incident these objects and these 
spatiotemporal facts will naturally be perceived and encoded together.  It would be 
difficult, if not impossible, in this example, to see that it was yellow van without 
seeing it on one’s left.  Of course, the friend’s memory may lose these elements 
selectively; but this is a clear property of event encoding.  To witness an event means 
to be presented with WWW together; whereas to be told about an event is to be 
presented with the event in clauses, element-by-element.  Given this, a subject who is 
unable to lay down episodic traces will be unable to preserve the perceptual unity of 
the original experience, while perhaps recording nonetheless the elements as 
relatively independent entities.   
 Second, turning to animal learning, students of learning in the laboratory rat 
have traditionally drawn a distinction between models of learning in which stimuli are 
associated as distinct elements –– “elemental” approaches –– and models in which 
stimuli are represented as a single, blended unit –– “configural” approaches. John 
Pearce (1994) is one of the more significant workers arguing for configural 
representation in the context of animal learning.  Indeed, in the work of Iordanova et 
al (2011) on “episodic-like” WWW memory in the rat this distinction is drawn in the 
service of investigating how the existence of a configural relation between the WWW 
elements depends upon the integrity of the hippocampus.  They refer to the Pearce 
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(1994) model in which each element is linked to a fourth unit that is common to all 
but independent of each.  In the latter case only, the WWW-memory forms a unity. 
Applied to WWW memory in development, the empirical claim is that if 
WWW memory is episodic it will be configural, not elemental. There is some debate, 
however, over the degree to which adult episodic memory is non-elemental (Duzel et 
al, 1997; Fisher & Chandler, 1991; Brewer & Dupree, 1983; Newcombe, Lloyd & 
Ratcliff, 2007) or fragmented (Wagenaar, 1986; Morton, Hammersley & Bekerian, 
1985; Trinkler et al, 2006). However, what elementality exists in adult episodic 
memory may be a function of its concept-exercising and strategic nature, which are 
features not shared by WWW-memories of the proto-episodic kind, on the present 
view.  
A third motivation for this configural analysis is offered by the work of 
Iordanova et al (2011) and others on the role of the hippocampus in What-When-
Where memory in the rat. If indeed the kind of WWW memory under consideration is 
essentially a form of hippocampally-mediated memory then configurality is what one 
would expect. Neural network modelling of hippocampal function has converged on 
the view that one of its core functions is that of pattern completion by autoassociation, 
such that given a sub-set of the input the network will output the compete pattern 
(McNaughton and Morris, 1987; Morris & Frey, 1997; Rolls and Treves, 1998). Our 
method of assessing non-elementality/configurality depends upon an assumption very 
close to autoassociation. 
3.The present empirical strategy in the context of related research findings 
 In the light of these considerations, our empirical strategy for examining 
WWW-proto-episodic memories in children of two and three years of age was to 
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employ a deferred-imitation
2
 procedure in which the children watched a 
demonstration on the first day that produced an interesting effect, after which they 
were invited to reproduce the effect on the second day.  The demonstration had a 
WWW-structure in the follow respects.  The What element was either an object (a 
computerised icon, in Experiment One) or an action (produced on a lever, in 
Experiment Two). The When element was the order in which the objects were moved 
or the actions were performed. The Where element was essentially egocentric in 
Experiment One whereas allocentric cues were afforded in Experiment Two. Finally, 
in both studies we investigated whether recall was elemental or configural (borrowing 
this term from the animal literature) by the application of a statistical model.  
 Because we wished to have a measure of episodic memory as unaffected as 
possible by semantic scaffolding we ensured that the WWW-elements had no natural 
relationships among them. That is to say, the causal relations between the W-elements 
were semantically arbitrary rather than meaningful. Meaningful relations among 
modelled elements in imitation studies are referred to by Bauer and colleagues 
(Bauer, 2013, for a recent review) as “enabling relations.”  We will adopt Bauer’s 
term. 
 We now place this strategy within the context of what is known about the 
deferred imitation of sequences in infants and toddlers and about pre-school 
children’s WWW memory.  First, many of the elements of the proto-episodic memory 
sketched at the beginning of this section, are in place in infants and toddlers: (a) recall 
of actions and placements over long periods, (b) doing so in the correct order, and (c) 
                                                 
2
 This term is not ideal given that our procedure might be regarded as “observational causal learning” 
(as in Meltzoff, Waismeyer & Gopnick, 2012). However, as the term “differed imitation” is used in the 
memory, rather than the causal, literature, we have used that. Note too that because the children are not 
given the opportunity to act on the materials before the retention interval, as in Bauer’s (2013) 
procedure of “elicited” imitation, we do not used the term elicited imitation. 
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recalling complex sequences after a single exposure, (d) recalling the modelled events 
in a declarative format. As for (a), not only can infants remember individual actions 
for delays lasting months (e.g., Bauer et al, 2000) but there is reason to believe that 
14-month-olds, at least, can recall not only what the props afford but particular bodily 
movements of the modeller (Meltzoff, 1988). In (b), although it is clear that young 
children’s delayed recall of sequences is much more successful if the sequences 
contain enabling relations (e.g., Bauer, Hertsgaard, & Wewerka, 1995) the delayed 
recall of arbitrarily-ordered sequences is possible in older infants and toddlers and is 
well in place by the end of the second year (Wenner & Bauer, 1999; Bauer et al, 
1998). As for (c), children of at least 16 months recall single-exposure actions over 
one month (Bauer & Leventon, 2013).  Finally, the question –– (d) ––  of whether 
young children’s recollection of action-sequences is in a declarative format can be 
answered positively. Bauer, Wenner and Kroupina (2002) report that 3-year-old 
children, who have acquired the verbal skills to do, so can talk about the experiences 
they had taking part in deferred-imitation studies at 20 months. 
 With regard to the final point, although the Bauer, Wenner and Kroupina 
(2002) study suggests that the kind of memory evoked in toddler’s deferred-imitation 
studies may indeed be semantic-declarative (in a language-accessible format; see 
above discussion of Tulving, 1972), a question hangs over whether it is in an 
episodic-declarative format –– whether there is true re-experiential memory in young 
children. Answers to this specific question have tended to employ a WWW 
framework.  The following studies are notable.  First, Hayne and Imuta (2011) used a 
hide-and-seek procedure with 3- and 4-year-olds, in which What was the kind of toy 
hidden, Where was the rooms in which toys were hidden, and When was the order of 
the hiding. Three-year-olds struggled with the When component. This divergence 
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between 3- and 4-year-old performance was replicated in another study from this 
laboratory (Sarf et al, 2011) using a “spoon-test” methodology (Tulving, 2005) in 
which the functional item referred to a past event: only 4-year-olds could retain the 
relevant event for 24 hours. The Hayne and Imuta study fulfils many of the desiderata 
sketched above. However, apart from differing from the present task in using search 
(and verbal recall), this study did not take the temporal element to refer to micro-
events within one demonstration, but to the order of three hiding events. Newcombe, 
Balcomb, Ferrara, Hansen, and Koski  (2014) used a WWW-design in which one of 
the Ws was Which-context. Children from 15 months to 3 years had to recall that toy 
X was in box A in room 1 but in box B in room 2, with toy type being What, box 
being Where, and room being Which-Context (analogous to a rat-study by Eacott and 
Norman, 2004).  Success on this task emerged within the second year of life.  At the 
very end of the paper we will ask whether it is possible to regard the Which-context 
element as one of simultaneity, and thus as a temporal element. 
 In the light of this it can be said that although infants and toddlers have a form 
of event memory that has some features of episodic recall and although pre-schoolers 
successfully integrate semantic and spatiotemporal elements of events to some degree, 
we have as yet no evidence that children under 4 years show WWW memory of the 
kind outlined at the beginning of this section.  As initially noted in Section 1, 4 years 
is the age at which evidence appears for a more conceptually-mediated kind of 
episodic recall (Perner, 2001; Perner & Ruffman, 1995; Perner, Kloo & Gornik, 
2007). “Proto-episodic,” recall, is taken by us to mean the kind of nonconceptual 
episodic memory that emerges before this age. 
4. The first study, spatial content, and the elemental model 
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The two experiments to be reported here differed centrally in terms of the kind of 
spatial information presented to the child.  In the first study, the spatial information 
was two-dimensional (2D) and in the second it was three-dimensional (3D).  In the 
first case, spatial cues were egocentric to the extent the locations were fixed in terms 
of left/right and above/below (e.g., top left-hand corner). In the second case, by 
contrast, actions were carried out on an object in a room so they could be coded as 
“next to the door/window/bookcase” and so were allocentric to that extent. 
Our first WWW-binding task was presented on a touch-screen.  In this task 
children were shown, on day-one, that it was possible to make the computer play a 
jolly song and show a smiley face by moving icons on the screen to corners in a 
certain order.  The spatial cues were the four corners of the screen (above-left, above-
right, below-left, below-right), the temporal cues were the orders in which the icons 
had to be moved (e.g., pig-icon or monkey-icon first) and the orders in which the 
locations had to be visited (e.g., top-right before bottom left) and the semantic content 
was the two icons. The children had to reproduce the icon-movements on the second 
day in order to activate the song and picture.  This is, therefore, a test of 
spatiotemporal-to-semantic binding.  
Before passing on, it should be cautioned that it is a difficult matter to fix cues 
as purely egocentric. As long as a participant can regard points in space defined by 
above/below and left/right as locations at which things can be located, the purity of 
the egocentric coding can break down.  For example, in moving an icon to the top 
right-hand corner the child is free to regard this corner as a landmark even if what is 
“top right-hand” would alter if the screen were moved around 900. They could regard 
a particular corner of the screen as a landmark cue, despite its not being perceptually 
distinctive. For this reason we shall describe the studies as differing in terms of 
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2D/3D and leave the full treatment of egocentric versus allocentric coding to the 
General Discussion. 
In a control condition, we presented children with a task that was structurally 
similar to the What-When-Where task insofar as icons had to be manipulated on a 
touch-screen, but which had no spatiotemporal content.  This is to say that recall of 
locations or orders was not necessary in this task, only the recall of object-object 
relations.  This was a What-What-What task.  
We used statistical modelling to determine whether recall was or was not 
elemental.  Our elemental model assumed that recall of each W-element was 
independent of the others.  If this assumption is correct then the chance of correctly 
recalling (say) two of the W-elements should be the simple product of the chance of 
correctly recalling each of them.  By “chance” here we intend the post-hoc probability 
of a group of children recalling an element.  That is to say, if the children are recalling 
each W in isolation from the others then the chance of recalling more than one of 
them is fully predictable my multiplication. For example, if a third of the group recall 
one W then the chance of doing so is 0.33, and if a half of them recall another W then 
the chance of their doing so is 0.5.  On an elemental model then, there should be a 
0.165 (0.33 x 0.5) chance of children recalling both. If, however, the probability of 
recalling one W is affected by the probability of recalling another, as in configural 
recall, then this will not hold.  If recall is configural then there will be no fit to the 
elemental model. In the Results section of Experiment One we give a detailed account 
of how the elemental model gives rise to predicted recall scores which can be 
compared with observed scores. 
5. Predictions 
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Based on the above analysis it was possible to make the following predictions 
about the outcome of Experiment One. 
1. If episodic memory inherits the spatiotemporal nature of the original 
experience and if the spatial content can be coded in 2D space (with the temporal 
content being captured by intra-event order) there should be a clear divergence in 
developmental trajectory between the What-When-Where and the What-What-What-
tasks.  This is because, on the present analysis, the former will be tapping a form of 
episodic memory and the latter will not. 
2. If a hallmark of early What-When-Where memory is its configural nature 
then there should be evidence for this form of memory in the performance of the 
children on the What-When-Where task, but no evidence for it in the What-What-
What task.  Performance on the former task should fail to conform to an elemental 
model, but performance on the latter should conform to it. 
 
Experiment One 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 242 two- and three-year-olds (118 females) from a city in eastern England 
were recruited for this study. The children were recruited through local nursery 
schools and play-groups and through posters and fliers.  The parent or caretaker 
received £8 travelling expenses if they travelled to the laboratory. The sample was 
predominantly middle class and European in origin. Of the initial sample, 18 were 
excluded from the final sample, either for failing the warm-up task, (2), refusing to 
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participate on day-two (9), equipment failure/experimenter error (6) and interfering 
with the demonstration on day-one (1), making a final total of 224 participants.  It is 
likely that the children were familiar with touch-screen technology, if not from iPads 
then from nursery computers or their parents’ smart-phones. 
We consider the children within 6-month age bands when reporting success on 
the task, and consider them in two ages for application of the elemental model, as the 
model was more meaningful with a larger sample size. There were 56 children in the 
24-29 month age range (M = 26.4 months, SD = 1.92 months), 56 in the 30-35 month 
age range (M = 32.3 months, SD = 1.61 months), 56 in the 36-41 month age range (M 
= 38.9 months, SD = 1.65 months) and 56 in the 42-47 month age range (M = 44.6 
months, SD = 1.65 months).  Half of the children in each age band were randomly 
assigned to the What-When-Where condition and half were assigned to the What-
What-What condition: 28 children in each at each age level for each task.  
Apparatus 
The study was conducted on an Apple iPad touch-screen computer (screen 
19.7cm by 14.8cm). A specially programmed application was used for this purpose. 
Children sat directly facing the touch-screen, which was either placed on a table or 
held by the experimenter. The computer recorded all responses automatically. 
Design  
There were two between-subjects variables. These were age (2/3 years) and task 
(What-When-Where or What-What-What). ). Children were randomly assigned to one 
of the tasks. 
The tasks 
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Warm-up task 
Children first completed a warm-up task in which four coloured shapes (a red triangle, 
a yellow circle, a green square and a blue cross) rotated around the centre point of the 
touch-screen and four coloured boxes, each one corresponding to the colour of a 
shape, were located in each of the four corners of the screen. The goal was to touch 
and drag each shape into the corner box of the corresponding colour. When a shape 
was correctly placed in its colour-matched box feedback was given (a “thumbs up” 
icon appeared and plus the words “Well done!”). No feedback was given when shapes 
were placed in un-matched boxes. After each trial, the shape that had been moved 
returned to its original position and all the shapes recommenced rotation. The task 
was designed to give children experience of dragging icons from the centre of the 
screen to the corners. The spatial arrangement of the shapes and boxes was congruent 
with the arrangement of the animal and box icons in the experimental tasks. Children 
who failed the warm-up task were those who were simply unable to learn the principle 
of matching the colours.  Additionally, verbally prompting them was inefficacious. 
This is in contrast to those children who simply refused to touch the screen but who 
were responsive to verbal cues and could tell the experimenter where to move the 
colours –– see immediately below. 
 Twelve children who refused to move the icons in the warm-up completed the 
task by responding to experimenter prompts. They responded by pointing to the icon 
and then to the box to which the icon should be moved after verbal prompts. These 
were prompts such as “Which one shall I pick?” and  “Where do I put this one?” The 
experimenter moved them on the child’s instructions. 
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(b)  
 
Figure 1 (a) Screen-shot of What-When-Where task. (b) Screen-shot of What- 
 
What-What task 
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What-when-where task  
Figure (1a) shows a screen configuration of the What-When-Where task. In 
each of the four corners of the screen there was a blue box. The animal icons moved 
slowly clockwise around the centre point of the screen at a speed of 1 revolution per 
18 seconds. The goal of the game was to make “a funny song” play by performing a 
particular sequence of actions. The correct sequence involved placing one of the 
animals in one of the boxes (by touching and dragging it to that location) and then 
placing the second animal in another of the boxes. The orders in which the animals 
were moved and the box location they were moved towards were counterbalanced 
across participants. When the sequence was complete a smiling face appeared on the 
screen accompanied by a 10 second clip of the chorus from the “Laughing 
Policeman.” When an animal was touched, both animals stopped rotating. Once the 
first animal had been placed in a box and released, it disappeared for 2 seconds and 
then reappeared in its original location, after which both animals recommenced 
rotation.  Only then could the second move be made.  Accordingly, participants were 
free to move the same animal twice.  They were also free to place the second animal 
they had moved into the same box into which they had placed the animal they had 
moved first. The experimental sequence was demonstrated twice to children. After a 
24hr delay they were given the opportunity to “make the funny song play” 
themselves. The song always played after two animal-to-box moves had been made, 
irrespective of which animal(s) were moved to which box(es) and in which order. The 
12 children who had refused to touch the iPad on the warm-up received verbal 
prompts to elicit pointing, as they had done in the warm-up.  Prompts were: “Which 
animal do I have to pick?” and “Where do I put this one?”  The experimenter 
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completed the actions as directed by children and the iPad recorded the responses as it 
did on all other trials. 
What-What-What task 
Figure 1(b) shows a screen configuration of the What-What-What task. As 
with the What-When-Where task the animals rotated around the centre point of the 
screen. Four hats (yellow hard-hat, red Fez, black trilby and purple fedora) were 
arranged in a line across the top of the screen. The order in which the hats were 
arranged was randomized from trial to trial with the constraint that the same order 
never occurred on two consecutive trials. A green box and a blue box were located in 
two of the four corners. As with the hats, each box was randomly assigned to one of 
the four corners with the constraint that they did not reappear in the same corner from 
trial to trial. To make the “funny song” play in this game, a hat was placed on the 
head of one of the animals and that animal was then moved to one of the boxes. The 
animals could not be moved unless a hat had been placed on them. Then a second hat 
was placed on the head of the second animal and that animal was placed in the second 
box. When the first animal had been placed in one of the boxes it did not return, 
leaving a single animal. Children were presented with two demonstrations of the two 
hat-animal-box pairings. However, as the order in which the animals were placed in 
the box was irrelevant, the second demonstration reversed the order of the first 
demonstration. So that if children had been shown Red Hat - Pig – Green Box and 
then Yellow Hat – Monkey – Blue Box on the first demonstration they then saw Yellow 
Hat – Monkey – Blue Box and then Red Hat - Pig – Green Box on the second 
demonstration.  Note that although the WWW were semantic rather than 
spatiotemporal-semantic, there were no enabling relations (see Introduction Section 3) 
fixing location or order.  
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The probability of passing each of the tasks by chance was 1/64
3
. Both tasks 
allow for a scoring system in terms of individual elements that were recalled, which 
could then be used to assess whether recall of these elements was elemental. In the 
What-When-Where task children were given a point for correct animal selection (i.e. 
selecting each animal on different occasions rather than selecting the same animal 
twice), a further point for selecting the animals in the correct order, a point for 
selecting the correct locations and a point for selecting the locations in the correct 
order. Children who recalled the exact sequence scored 4 points. In the What-What-
What task children received a point for recall of the correct hats, a point for placing 
the hats on the correct animals and a point for placing the animals in the correct box, 
making a possible total of 3 points.  Note that although one task was scored out of 
fewer points than the other, success by chance was equally likely in each.  The 
difference in total number of points was inevitable given the temporal structure of 
What-When-Where, in which both location and icon-choice have to be bound to 
order.  The elemental model that was applied to these scores will be described in the 
Results section. 
Procedure   
Performance was recorded automatically on the computer.  The majority of 
children (75%) were tested at nursery, whereas the remaining 25% of the children 
were tested in their own homes or in our laboratory. The testing location was always 
the same from day 1 to day 2. Testing always began with the colour-matching warm-
                                                 
3
 In the What-When-Where task, there was ½ chance of picking the correct icon animal initially, then a 
¼ chance of moving it to the correct corner, then another ½ chance of picking the second animal 
correctly, followed by a ¼ chance of moving it to the correct corner. In the What-What-What task there 
was a ½ chance of picking one of the two correct hats, followed by a ½ chance of putting this on the 
correct animal, followed by a ½ chance of putting this in the correct box; after this a ¼ chance of 
picking the other correct hat. As there was now only one animal remaining this was followed by a ½ 
chance of putting the hat-wearing animal in the correct box. 
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up game. The experimenter demonstrated touching and dragging the shapes into the 
colour-matched boxes and then invited children to try. Once children had successfully 
moved all 4 shapes into their respective boxes at least once they progressed on to the 
experimental task. As noted, a small number of children (12) refused to touch the 
screen during the warm-up game. These children were encouraged to point to the 
boxes where the shapes should be placed (“Can you show me where the [blue] 
triangle goes?”). If they did this successfully (correctly indicating which box to place 
each shape in at least once) they progressed to the experimental task. We analysed the 
data both with and without the data from these children included (see below).  
Once they had completed the warm-up task children heard: “We are now 
going to play a new game. This new game is with animals. In this game we will make 
a funny song play. Would you like to hear the funny song? There is a special way to 
make the funny song play. I am going to show you how to do it.” 
The application was then opened to reveal the experimental task. In both 
experimental tasks children were asked to name the animals, in order to maintain 
interest. In the What-When-Where task the experimenter then brought the four corner 
boxes to children’s attention: “Look at these four boxes” (experimenter points to each 
box in turn). In the What-What-What task, the experimenter pointed to the four hats, 
naming each one by its colour and then pointed to the boxes, labeling them by colour. 
All children were then asked: “Do you want to see how to make the funny song play? 
This is how we do it.” In the What-When-Where task the experimenter, while 
performing the demonstration, told children, “First we move this one to this box here. 
Then we move this one to this box here”. In the What-What-What task the 
experimenter told children, “This hat goes on this one here and he goes into this box 
here. And this hat goes on this one here and he goes into this box here.” Children 
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were then given a second demonstration with the same instructions. At the end of the 
second demonstration children were told by the experimenter “Tomorrow I will come 
back and we will play the game again. It will be your turn to make the funny song 
play.” 
Note that because we wanted to maximize egocentric coding of spatial cues on 
these tasks (e.g., top-right hand, bottom left-hand) we did not place the screen near 
landmark cues, but on a bare desk. Otherwise, it was held before the child.  
On day-two children were first given the opportunity to play the warm-up 
game. After completing four warm-up trials the experimenter then told children that 
they were going to play the other game. The relevant application was then opened. If 
children needed further encouragement they were told, “What do we need to do in this 
game? How do we make the funny song play?” The song played after two animal-to-
box moves had been made, irrespective of whether or not children had performed the 
demonstrated sequence. Children who had refused to touch the screen in the warm-up 
game were asked, “Can you show me how to make the funny song play? What do I 
have to do?” If children pointed to an animal in the What-When-Where condition the 
experimenter would then ask, “What do I do with this one?” If the child pointed to 
one of the boxes the experimenter moved the animal to that box. Similarly, in the 
What-What-What condition, if the child pointed to one of the hats but did not then 
indicate which animal to place the hat on the experimenter would ask, “What do I do 
with this one?” 
Results 
 
Performance on the tasks 
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Preliminary analysis revealed that location of testing (nursery versus home or 
lab) had no effect on pass-rates on either task. Furthermore, none of the analyses 
reported below were affected by excluding children who gave pointing responses after 
verbal encouragement (described at end of Methods section) rather than motor ones. 
The percentages of children passing each task within the four age bands are given in 
Table 1. By “passing” the task we mean reproducing the complete WWW set. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of children in each condition who passed the two touch-
screen tasks (numbers of passes in parentheses) 
 
Age (months) What-When-Where What-What-What 
24-29  7 (2/28) 4 (1/28) 
30-35  14 (4/28) 11 (3/28) 
36-41  29 (8/28) 36 (10/28) 
42-47 29 (8/28) 43 (12/28) 
All children  20 (22/112) 23 (26/112) 
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Table 2. Percentage of children recalling elements and element combinations on 
the What-When-Where touch-screen task at two ages 
 
 What* What-
When 
What-
Where 
Where Where-
When 
What-When-
Where 
2-year-olds 73 48 20 34 18 11 
3-year-olds 89 57 38 61 41 29 
*Note that unbound recall of What in this task means recalling that each icon 
should be manipulated only once. Children who failed to recall What moved 
one icon twice.  
 
Table 3. Percentage of children recalling elements and element combinations on 
the What-What-What touch-screen task at two ages, 
 
 Hats Hats-animal Animal-boxes Hat-animal-
box 
2-year-olds 32 21 38 7 
3-year-olds 57 52 64 39 
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Inspection of Table 1 suggests that performance differed little between the 
tasks at each age. Indeed the tasks did not reliably differ in difficulty overall:  2(1, N 
= 224) = 0.42, p = 0.52. There was no significant effect of age on pass-rate in the 
What-When-Where task, 2(3, N = 112) = 6.11, p = 0.11, although there was an effect 
of age on pass-rates in the What-What-What task, 2(3, N = 112) = 17.03, p < 0.01.  
Comparing performance against chance 
Recall that the probability of passing each of the tasks by chance is 1/64. 
Comparisons against chance within each age-band were by one-tailed Binomial Tests. 
The proportion of young 2-year-olds who passed the What-When-Where task failed to 
reach significance (p = 0.07). The proportion of younger 2-year-olds who passed the 
What-What-What task was likewise not significantly above chance (p = .36). The 
proportion of older 2-year-olds who passed the What-When-Where task was 
significantly better than chance (p < 0.01), as was the proportion of older 2-year-olds 
who passed the What-What-What (p < 0.01).  Performance was also superior to 
chance in all the higher age-bands. 
Applying the elemental model 
 The percentage recall of the individual elements and the relevant bindings 
(order is relative to both icon and action, and icon-choice is relative to order and 
location) are shown in Tables 2.  These are the data that went into the elemental 
model for the What-When-Where task. 
The elemental model was designed to determine whether recall of any given 
element was independent of recall of any other element. We will illustrate how this 
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model was applied to the What-When-Where data, with the same basic procedure 
being applied to the What-What-What data.  
In the What-When-Where task children were given 1 point each for correct 
recall of both locations (L), correctly choosing different icons for each movement (I), 
binding locations correctly to order (LO) and binding icons correctly to order (IO). 
Scores therefore ranged from 0 to 4.  
There were two possible ways for children to score 1 point: by placing the 
same icon in the correct locations but visiting those locations in the wrong order, or 
by using both icons but in the wrong order and placing (at least one) them at the 
wrong location. There were three possible ways for children to score 2 points: they 
could place both icons in the correct order at the wrong locations; they could visit the 
correct locations in the correct order but using the same icon twice; they could visit 
the correct locations in the wrong order, using both icons but also in the wrong order. 
If children recalled both locations correctly and used different icons at the two 
locations then they necessarily scored a minimum of 2 points. Whether they scored 
more than 2 points was determined by the order in which they visited the locations 
and the order in which they manipulated the icons. If they got the order correct for 
location but not for icons they would score 3. Conversely, if they were correct for 
icon order but incorrect about location order they scored 3. Finally, if they were 
correct both on icon order and location order they scored 4 points. 
The strategy in the elemental model was the following. First, the probability 
that children at each age would be correct on each of the elements was worked out 
from the data.  For example, if a third of the children at one age-level were correct on 
location-order this would be a probability of 0.33. If we assume that the different 
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components of the task are recalled independently from one another then we can 
model the probability of obtaining recall scores (from 0 to 4) by multiplying the 
observed probabilities of recalling each component to yield conjoint probabilities, as 
in the following examples. [See the Appendix for how each of the 5 (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) 
score-probabilities was worked out.]  The expected probability of scoring 0 is the 
product of the probability of getting location incorrect and of wrongly choosing the 
same icon each time.  This is 1 minus the probability of getting location correct times 
1 minus the probability of getting icon-manipulation correct (P = the empirical 
probability of getting an element correct): 1-P(L).(1-P(I). The expected probability of 
scoring 4 points is equal to the probability of getting location correct and icon-
manipulation correct and location order (given location) correct and icon 
manipulation correct: P(L). P(I). P(LO/L). P(AO/I).  The resulting probabilities were 
then taken as the expected proportions of children within an age level who would 
obtain these scores, expressed as numbers of children (‘Expected’), which were then 
compared against the number of children actually obtaining these scores (‘Observed’).  
Because the number of the expected frequencies within some cells was very 
small, it was not possible to run this model at each of the 6-month age-bands.  
Accordingly, the model was run at age 2 and age 3.  See Figure 2 for the comparisons 
of Expected and Observed scores for age 2. 
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Figure 2. Observed scores against those expected on the elemental model for 2- 
 
year-olds on the What-When-Where task. 
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chi square test of goodness of fit revealed that there was no significant difference 
between the distribution of Expected and Observed recall scores: 2(4, N = 56) = 5.13, 
p = 0.22.  
The Observed and Expected recall scores for 3-year-olds on the What-When-
Where task are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Observed scores against those expected on the elemental model for 3- 
 
year-olds on the What-When-Where task. 
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chi square test of goodness of fit revealed that there was no significant 
difference between the distribution of Expected and Observed recall scores for the 3-
year-olds, 2(4, N = 56) = 2.73, p = 0.6. 
For the What-What-What task children were given one point for recalling each 
of the following elements: the correct hats, the correct animal-hat pairings and the 
correct animal-box pairings. Possible recall scores ranged from 0 to 3 with a 
maximum score of 3 for children who pass the task.  
The percentage recall of the individual elements and the relevant combinations 
are shown in Table 3.  These are the data that went into the elemental model for the 
What-What-What task.   Figure 4 shows the Observed and Expected distribution of 
recall scores on the What-What-What task for 2-year-olds.  
 32 
 
 
Figure 4. Observed scores against those expected on the elemental model for 2- 
 
year-olds on the What-What-What task. 
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chi square test of goodness of fit revealed that there was no significant 
difference between the distribution of Expected and Observed recall scores 2(3, N = 
56) = 0.09, p = 0 .99. 
Figure 5 shows the Observed and Expected distributions under the elemental 
model for recall scores of 3-year-olds on the What-What-What task. 
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Figure 5. Observed scores against those expected on the elemental model for 3- 
 
year-olds on the What-What-What task. 
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 chi square test of goodness-of-fit revealed that there was no significant 
difference between the distribution of Expected and Observed recall scores for this 
age group 2(3, N = 56) = 2.92, p = 0 .4.  
Discussion 
 Neither prediction was confirmed. There was no difference in performance 
between the What-When-Where group and the What-What-What group, suggesting 
that spatiotemporal content was playing no role in recall. Also, there was no evidence 
for non-elemental/configural memory in the What-When-Where group. 
In considering the reasons for this outcome, it is natural to turn to the question 
of the kind spatial content in the tasks, and to the fact that the spatial environment was 
2D, an environment that naturally affords egocentric spatial coding.  Given this, we 
asked whether we would find evidence for configural episodic memory when children 
were presented not with a two-dimensional medium without landmark cues, as in 
Experiment One, but with a three-dimensional layout (a room) in which it was 
possible to code the spatial location of the semantic element by utilising allocentric 
cues such as ‘near X.’ In this situation “what” was a kind of action rather than a kind 
of object.  
There were two main reasons why we decided to make the semantic element 
(“What”) an action rather than an object in Experiment Two.  In the first place, in 
order to parallel the iPad task with objects it would have been necessary to arrange 
things such that the initially-placed object returned to its original location for the 
second choice. Second, we had evidence from a previous deferred-imitation WWW 
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study using an action that young children accommodate well to such a situation and 
find it meaningful (Russell & Davies, 2012). 
In the laboratory, children were presented with a ‘music box’ with an upright 
handle at each of the four sides that afforded two actions equally –– pumping and 
twirling (see Figure 6). The experimenter showed the children that pumping one of 
the handles and then twirling another (or vice versa) turned the box on. They returned 
to the lab the next day and were invited to make the box come on again.  
Note that in this kind of demonstration there will necessarily be allocentric 
cues, given that the pumping and twirling will be done near a feature of the room 
(e.g., near the door/the window).  However it was also possible to provide the option 
of coding the location of the actions egocentrically.  Thus, if the child watches the 
demonstration from a fixed point then each action would be ‘on my left’, ‘on my 
right’, ‘near me’, or ‘far from me’.  This was one of our two conditions: the viewer-
centred condition in which children remained in a chair and watched the actions from 
that point, side-on to the box.  In the other condition, by contrast –– the object-centred 
condition –– the child followed the experimenter round the box as he performed the 
actions.  In this condition egocentric coding was not possible as it was in the viewer-
centred condition. If children are entirely reliant upon allocentric cues, and do not 
avail themselves of egocentric ones, then there should be no difference in 
performance on the two conditions, as it would seem to be equally possible to code, 
say, ‘pumping near the door’ in the two cases.  
Next, what warrant do we have for assuming that children of this age can 
indeed utilise allocentric cues like “near the window?”  Nardini et al (2006) have 
shown that children of at least 3 years of age can utilise what they called 
“environmental” cues of this kind, although struggling to code location by more local 
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“intrinsic” allocentric cues.  Their task was a demanding one in which objects had to 
be retrieved after self- or display-reorientation, or both.  It is a reasonable conjecture 
that under-3s will be able to utilise such environmental cues in a simpler task without 
reorientation conditions (see Newcombe et al, 2013, for a review supporting this 
conjecture). 
Experiment Two 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 131 two- and three-year-olds (62 females) from a city in eastern 
England were recruited for this study. The children were recruited through local 
nursery schools and play-groups and through posters and fliers.  The parent or 
caretaker received £8 travelling expenses. The sample was predominantly middle 
class and European in origin and was divided into four six-month age bands. Eight 
children in the youngest age group (24-29 months) were removed from the final 
sample for either refusing to engage with the music box on the second visit (3), 
inattention during the first visit (2), parental interference (2), or experimenter error 
(1). Two children were removed from the 30-35 month age group for inattentiveness 
during the first visit. Six children were removed from the 36-41 month age group 
(parental interference at testing (3), refusing to engage with music box during the 
second visit (2) and inattention during the first visit (1). Three children from the eldest 
age group (42-47 months) were removed due to experimenter error. “Inattention” 
included children who refused to sit on the chair and observe, immediately playing 
with the box upon its unveiling, or refused to follow the experimenter round the box 
or listen to the story. 
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We consider the children within 6-month age bands when reporting success on 
the task, and consider them in two ages for application of the elemental model, as the 
model was more meaningful with a larger sample size. The final sample of 112 
children comprised 28 children in the 24-29 month age range (M = 26.1 months, SD = 
1.7 months), 28 in the 30-35 month age range (M = 31.8 months, SD = 2.3 months), 
28 in the 36-41 month age range (M = 38.4 months, SD = 1.9 months) and 28 in the 
42-47 month age range (M = 44.3 months, SD = 1.6 months).  Half of the children in 
each age band were randomly assigned to the viewer-centred condition and half were 
assigned to the object-centred condition: 14 in each.  
Apparatus  
 A special music box was constructed for this study (see Figure 6). The sides of 
the box were 46 cm in length and the box measured 40 cm in height. Four handles 
protruded from the top of the box. Each handle was located 5 cm from the edge of one 
side of the box, equidistant from the two nearest corners. The handles had a central 
column 16 cm in length with a wheel 10 cm in diameter, fixed on top of the column. 
The handles afforded two actions: they could either be pumped up and down or 
rotated around the column. In addition, there were four lights located on top of the 
box, one at each corner. When activated, the box played music and the lights flashed 
in a variety of colours.  
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Figure 6. The music box
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Design & Procedure 
 There were two test sessions separated by approximately 24 hours. In the first 
session the experimenter demonstrated how to turn on the music box, by (for 
example) pumping first at North and then twirling at East, or pumping at South and 
twirling at North, using all possible pairings. In the second session the music box was 
reintroduced to children and they were invited to turn it on. To do so they had to 
perform the correct actions, at the correct locations in the correct order. The child’s 
perspective at demonstration was manipulated. In the viewer-centred condition 
children remained seated in a chair while the experimenter moved around the box to 
the first and then the second handle. In the object-centred condition the child 
accompanied the experimenter as he walked to the first and then to the second handle. 
Thus, in the object-centred condition the child was always directly facing the handle 
that the experimenter was manipulating.  
 Testing took place in the playroom in our laboratory. Children were 
accompanied by a parent/caregiver at all times during both sessions. Each session 
began with a 5-10 minute warm up period, in which the experimenter engaged the 
child in free play with toys in the room. At this stage, the music box was in the centre 
of the room but was covered with a sheet. No reference was made to the music box at 
this stage unless children expressed curiosity about what was under the cloth (very 
few children did). Once children were deemed by the experimenter to be comfortable 
and attentive they were invited to sit in a ‘special chair’ next to Harry the Hippo, as 
Harry wanted to show them his new toy. This chair faced the box adjacent to one of 
the four sides of the box (counterbalanced across all participants).  
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Children were told that Harry the Hippo (a cloth doll in the room) had recently 
celebrated his birthday. They were shown a photograph of Harry beside a gift-
wrapped present and told that this was Harry receiving his birthday present. They 
were then told that Harry’s present was under the cloth and that Harry wanted to show 
them it. The cloth was then removed to reveal the music box. The experimenter 
brought children’s attention to the four handles. He counted the handles, touching 
them one at a time. The experimenter then demonstrated how to make the handles 
move. This demonstration was always performed on one of the two handles not used 
in the subsequent test procedure. Children were told that “the handles can move like 
this” at which point the experimenter either pumped or turned the handle, “or the 
handles can move like this” at which point the second action was demonstrated. The 
order in which the two actions were demonstrated was counterbalanced across 
participants.   
The experimenter proceeded to tell the children “there is a special way of 
turning on the music box. But Harry does not know how to turn on the music box. 
Harry is very sad about this. But I am going to show Harry, and I am going to show 
you too, how to turn on the music box. Would you like to see how to turn on the 
music box?”  Children were then told that “the important thing is that you only need 
to touch two of the handles, these two here”, at which point the experimenter pointed 
to the two handles to be used in the test demonstration.  
At this point the experimenter knelt beside the first handle used in the 
experimental sequence and invited children in the object-centred condition to stand 
beside him. Children in the viewer-centred condition remained seated. The 
experimenter then told children “This is how you turn on the music box. First, you 
move this one like this”, at which point he either pumped or turned the first handle for 
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approximately 1-2 seconds. The experimenter then moved so that he was kneeling 
adjacent to the second handle (accompanied by children in the object-centred 
condition), and said “and then you move this one like this” at which point the second 
action was performed on the second handle for approximately 1-2 seconds. After a 
delay of approximately 1 second from the completion of the second action the box 
began to play music and the lights on top flashed different colours.  The music and 
lights were, in fact, surreptitiously controlled by a remote device in the experimenter’s 
pocket. After about 20 seconds the music and lights stopped. The experimenter then 
said to the child he would show them once more how to turn on the music box. 
Children were invited to sit in the chair beside Harry (if they had been standing the in 
object-centred condition) and then they were given the same demonstration as before 
with the same instructions. The music played again for a further 20 seconds 
approximately. The order in which the two actions (pumping and turning) were 
performed was counterbalanced across participants, as was the identity of the two 
handles used in the demonstration. For half of the children in each condition the first 
action was performed on the handle adjacent to the chair in which they were sitting 
(i.e., their starting-point in the object centred condition). For the remaining half 
neither the first nor second action was performed on the handle adjacent to the chair 
in which they sat. The two actions were never performed on the same handle and the 
location of the second action was counterbalanced among the three other handles. 
After the music stopped playing the second time the experimenter informed 
the child that he thought that the music box needed new batteries as it has not been 
working very well. The experimenter then covered the music box with the sheet and 
told children that he would buy new batteries for the music box and that they could 
come back tomorrow to play with it once it had been fixed.  
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Children returned to the lab 24 hours later with their parent/caregiver. After a 
brief warm-up period children were invited to sit beside Harry the Hippo. The 
location of the chair and music box was identical to that of the previous day’s visit. 
Children were informed that Harry wanted to show them his special birthday present 
again. The experimenter then uncovered the music box and told children “This is 
Harry’s music box. Harry would really like to hear the music, but unfortunately he 
cannot remember how to turn on the music box.” They were then asked by the 
experimenter “Can you help Harry turn on his music box?” If children required 
further prompting they were asked “Can you show Harry how to turn on the music 
box?” The experimenter waited until the child had performed two actions. The box 
was activated by the experimenter after the second action, regardless of whether or 
not the child had performed the correct action sequence. If children only performed 
one action initially the experimenter prompted them further by saying, “Is there 
anything else you can do to turn on the box?” If the child still failed to perform a 
second action the experimenter asked “Can you show me again how to turn on the 
box?” Any further action that they then performed immediately activated the music 
box. However, when coding the results, only the first action that these children 
performed was recorded.   
At the end of the second session parents/caregivers were fully debriefed, 
thanked and given £8 to cover their expenses. All test sessions were recorded on 
DVD. The first author scored all recordings coding the first two distinct actions that 
involved manipulating
4
 the handles, the location of those actions, and the order in 
which the actions were performed. A second independent rater, blind to the 
experimental hypothesis, coded a random selection of 28% of the videos. An inter-
                                                 
4
 Touching a handle without moving it was not coded as an action. 
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rater reliability analysis revealed a high consistency between raters : Cohen’s Kappa 
overall = 0.93; for action = 0.91; for action-order = 0.92; for location-order = 0.93; for 
location = 0.93. 
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Table 4. Percentage of children in each condition who passed the music box task 
(numbers by total in parentheses) 
 
Age (months) Object-Centred Viewer-Centred 
24-29  7 (1/14) 0 (0/14) 
30-35  29 (4/14) 29 (4/14) 
36-41  43 (6/14) 71 (10/14) 
42-47 71 (10/14) 50 (7/14) 
All children  38 (21/56) 38 (21/56) 
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Table 5. Percentages of children recalling individual elements and element 
combinations at each age on the music box task. 
 What What-
When 
What-
Where 
Where Where-
When 
What-When-
Where 
2-year-olds 66 39 20 27 23 16 
3-year-olds 86 64 63 80 77 59 
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Results  
Performance 
The percentages of children passing the task (i.e., with location, order, and 
action-types all correct) within each age-band and across the two conditions are 
shown in Table 4.  These did not differ significantly between the two conditions 
(object- and viewer-centred), 2 (1, N = 112) = 0, p = 1.00.  
 As is evident from Table 4, there is a discontinuity in performance between 
the younger and the older 2-year-olds.  Only one younger 2-year-old passed the task 
as compared with eight of the older 2-year-olds.  In fact, the single passing child was 
within a week of being 2-and-a-half. A chi square analysis revealed that the 
proportion of children passing differed significantly across the four age groups, 2(3, 
N = 112) = 25.75, p <0 .01. Applying Fisher’s exact test5 it was found that the 
proportion of children passing the task was significantly greater in the older 2-year-
olds than in the younger 2-year-olds (p <0 .05). It also showed that the proportion of 
children passing in the younger 3-year-old age-band was significantly greater than in 
the older 2-year-olds, 2 (1, N = 56) = 4.67, p <0 .05. Finally, the proportion of 
children in the older 3-year-old age-band who passed the task was not significantly 
greater than the proportion passing in the younger 3-year-old age-band, 2 (1, N = 56) 
= .07, p = 0.79. 
Comparing performance against chance 
                                                 
5
 Fisher’s Exact Test was used rather than Chi as two of the four cells in the contingency table had an 
expected value of less than 5. 
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Assessing whether correct recall of the event was superior to chance is 
problematic due to the difficulty of determining the a priori probability that children 
would produce the correct actions by chance. However, we can ask whether 
performance was better than chance given correct performance of the two actions. 
Seventy-seven percent of the children performed both actions correctly. The 
probability that children pass the task given recall of the correct actions is 1/32
6
. 
Binomial tests on the 77% of the children performing both actions revealed that the 
proportion of younger 2-year-olds who passed the task given recall of the actions was 
no greater than chance (p = 0.36), the proportion of older 2-year-olds who passed the 
task given recall of the actions was significantly greater than chance (p <0 .01), the 
proportion of younger 3-year-olds who passed the task given recall of the actions was 
significantly greater than chance (p <0 .01), as was the proportion of the older 3-year-
olds (p < 0.01).   
Applying the elemental model 
 The percentage recall of the individual elements and the relevant bindings 
(order is relative to both location and action) are shown in Table 5.  These are the data 
that went into the elemental model. 
The elemental model was applied to the data in exactly the same way as it was 
in the What-When-Where task of Experiment 1, with the only difference being that A 
for “action” replaces I for “icon.”  See Appendix.  As before, low expected values in 
some cells necessitated the amalgamation of data within a 2-year-old and a 3-year old 
band, rather than retaining the four 6-month age-bands.  
                                                 
6
 Four locations acted on twice times 2 orders = 32. 
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Figures 7 and 8 are histograms of the expected score distributions calculated in 
this way (‘Expected’) together with those for the range of scores actually obtained  
(‘Observed’) for both 2-year-olds and 3-year-olds.  Among 2-year-olds (Figure 7), 
there was a significant difference between Expected and Observed scores: (4, N = 
56) = 9.63, p <0 .05. In order to compare the distribution of Expected and Observed 
scores for the 3-year-olds (Figure 8) it was necessary to combine cell counts for recall 
scores of 0 and 1 to create a ‘1 ≤’ cell. This was due to the low expected frequency 
count for scores of 0 and 1. There was a significant difference between the Observed 
and Expected distribution for the 3-year-olds (Fig. Y), (3, N = 56) = 8.29, p < 0.05.  
The performance of both 2- and 3-year-olds was, then, inconsistent with the elemental 
model. 
 50 
 
 
Figure 7. Observed scores against those expected on the elemental model for 2- 
 
year-olds on the “music box” What-When-Where task. 
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Figure 8. Observed scores against those expected on the elemental model for 3- 
 
year-olds on the “music box” What-When-Where task. 
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Discussion 
This study has shown that when the spatial information provided in the 
original demonstration of a deferred-imitation task (with semantically-arbitrary What-
When-Where content) can be coded with 3D, clearly allocentric information then 
there is evidence of configural recollection of the What-When-Where elements at 
both age 2 and age 3. The low numbers of children scoring 3 points in this study (see 
Figures 7 and 8) is consistent with idea that children were likely either to fail to recall 
W-elements or recall all three of them: few children were “nearly there.”  Although 
there was only a modest difference in the degree of successful recollection between 
this task and the two WWW-tasks used in Experiment One, and no difference in the 
age at which superior-to-chance performance emerged, only in the music-box study 
was there evidence of non-elemental, and thus configural, recollection.  
 In the light of our earlier discussion, a plausible explanation for this difference 
is that in the What-When-Where task in Experiment One the spatial content was 2D 
whereas in the Experiment Two task the content was 3D and therefore naturally 
afforded allocentric coding.  The interpretation is supported by the fact that the 
provision of egocentric cues in the second experiment (in the viewer-centred 
condition) did not improve performance. 
 It would not be appropriate, however, to claim from these data that 2-year-old-
children are generally capable of configural recollection in What-When-Where tasks 
in which the spatial content can be coded allocentrically and the temporal content 
involves order information.  This is because of the very low level of success found in 
children below 2-and-a-half.  That said, because the performance of children above 
 53 
this age tended to be at an above-chance level it is fair to conclude that configural 
What-When-Where-binding can be seen to begin after 2-and-a-half. This could be 
taken to mean that a minimal form of episodic memory begins at this age. Two-and-
half is a plausible age for the onset of such a memorial capacity, given that after 2-
and-a-half may be when infantile amnesia begins to fade (Davis, Gross & Hayne, 
2008; Eacott & Crawley, 1998; though see Bruce et al, 2005, and Wells, Morrison & 
Conway, 2014 for later estimates).  
General Discussion 
One may conclude the following from these data. When only 2D, essentially 
egocentric, spatial cues are provided in the initial event (Experiment One) 2- to 3-
year-old children’s deferred-imitation recall is elemental, and putatively non-episodic. 
But when allocentric spatial information is afforded (Experiment Two) then 2- to 3-
year-old children’s memory is non-elemental and putatively “proto-episodic” (see 
Introduction, Section 1).  How can this difference be explained?  First, we will 
consider a plausible neuropsychological explanation for the result.  After this, we will 
resolve the seeming paradox that re-experiential memory is from a point-of-view and 
yet dependent upon allocentric coding. We then consider how these results can be 
placed in relation to what we already know about young children’ s deferred imitation 
and WWW binding. Finally, we will consider the prospects for taking the temporal 
element in WWW-memory to be simultaneity rather than order. 
 First, why did the difference between Experiment One and Two emerge?  The 
explanation may lie in hippocampal development.  Not only is it universally accepted 
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that the hippocampus plays a crucial role in episodic memory
7
 and spatial coding, but 
there are good grounds for thinking that early episodic memory is essentially 
hippocampal rather than frontal (Newcombe, Lloyd & Ratcliff, 2007; and see below). 
Moreover, as we have seen, Iordanova, Burnett, Good & Honey (2011), in their work 
on What-When-Where memory in the rat, report that such memories are disrupted by 
hippocampal lesions.  
  Crucially, the nature of this spatial coding in the hippocampus appears to be 
3D/allocentric rather than egocentric. The co-discoverer of place cells in the rat 
hippocampus John O’Keefe (see O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978) has argued, from single-
cell recording, that the spatial representation system in the rat hippocampus 
constitutes a perspective-independent mapping system with a layout-centred frame of 
reference (O’Keefe, 1990).  Indeed he has argued that this environmentally-anchored 
co-ordinate system is a good candidate for being the physiological underpinning of 
Kant’s spatial “a priori” (O’Keefe, 1993).  
Moreover, that the hippocampal mode of spatial representation in humans is 
allocentric rather than egocentric is consistent with studies showing that individuals 
with early hippocampal damage are specifically impaired in spatial memory tasks in 
which there is a shifted viewpoint (necessitating the remapping of egocentric 
information) at retrieval and when the background scene changes in same-view 
conditions (King, Trinkler, Vargha-Khadem & Burgess, 2004). In an imaging study of 
the intact adult brain, Burgess, McGuire, and O’Keefe (2002) have shown that the 
right hippocampus is implicated in recalling locations in an environment, with the left 
area being implicated in episodic memory. In the latter review, and with regard to the 
                                                 
7
 This is not to deny that the semantic binding is can also take place in the hippocampus (Manns, 
Hopkins and Squire, 2003), a fact relevant to our What-What-What control task. 
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question of landmark cues, the point is very clearly made that it is 3D landmarks that 
the hippocampus processes, not 2D ones.  
Turning to development, it is known from imaging studies that hippocampal 
volume increases substantially during the first 2 years of life (Utsunomiya, Takana, 
Okazaki, & Mitsudome, 1999). On the behavioural side, studies of early episodic 
memory development by Newcombe and her colleagues have resulted in a variety of 
data suggesting that success on what they regard as hippocampally-dependent tasks –
– tasks involving place learning –– becomes possible around the second year of life 
(Newcombe, Huttenlocher, Drummey, & Wiley, 1998; Sluzenski, Newcombe & 
Satlow, 2004). As mentioned earlier, Newcombe, Balcomb, Ferrara, Hansen, and 
Koski (2014) have shown that binding in memory what kind of toy to the box 
containing it and to the room in which the box was located is possible in the second 
year of life. This latter result will be discussed again below. 
That said, it is necessary to insert caveats about how the current data support 
this interpretation.  In the first place, as cautioned in the Introduction (Section 4) it is 
not impossible that the children in Experiment One were construing the corners as 
landmarks, despite their having no distinguishing perceptual features.  Second, there 
are a number of respects in which the two procedures differed, in addition to one of 
them being 2D and affording egocentric coding and one being 3D and affording 
allocentric coding.  For example, the semantic elements were different (icons versus 
actions), the semantic elements in the iPad task were constantly present, the music 
box procedure was narratively rich, and the children had to be more active in 
performing on it.  That said, features of this kind cannot naturally explain the 
qualitative differences between the two sets of data.  An account in terms of 
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allocenticity and hippocampal development is, however, satisfying.  This is of course 
a matter for further research. 
To come to the second issue (the “seeming paradox”), simply to say that the 
association between allocentric spatial coding and non-elemental, putatively episodic, 
recall is due to the fact that both kinds of processes are mediated by the hippocampus 
is to present a paradox.  As was said initially when considering the “egocentric” 
reading of the Kantian spatial “a priori”, both experience and re-experiential memory 
are “from a point of view,” which would immediately suggest that it is body-centred 
information that is preserved in episodic memory.  But this body-centred, perspectival 
information can represent, not merely bare egocentric relations of left/right, near/far, 
above/below, but also the knowledge that X was on my left/right etc by virtue of the 
fact that, in the past, I was bodily situated before an allocentrically-codable layout, in 
which some elements were positioned before us in such-and-such a way.  To expand 
on this point, imagine a visitor to London standing looking down Kensington Road 
with the Albert Hall on her left and the Albert Memorial on her right. She episodically 
recalls this view some time later.  One object is on her left and one is on her right, but 
within her episodic recollection of standing there these egocentric relations are taken 
to be such because the Albert memorial is in front of the concert hall with her body 
between them.  The point-of-view is a function of where she was and what was before 
what. So the paradox is resolved: recollection from an egocentric perspective can be 
grounded in allocentric coding because  “A on the left of B” in her experience and re-
experience is known to be due to the fact that her spatial position triangulated the two 
with B in front of A. Christoph Hoerl describes the significance of this matter thus: 
“the causal understanding involved in episodic memory consists in a grasp of certain 
spatiotemporal constraints on remembering, that is, of the fact that we must have been 
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around to witness an event before we can remember it.” (2001, p. 333; emphasis 
added).  
Quite apart from these “theory-internal” issues, it is necessary to consider the 
relevance of these data to the current state of the evidence for young children’s 
memory abilities as assessed by deferred imitation and other WWW procedures. This 
evidence was briefly reviewed in Section 3 of the Introduction. First, it would be too 
restrictive to say that because the deferred-imitation studies by Bauer, Meltzoff and 
others did not have an explicitly WWW structure that they could not have been 
tapping something close to re-experiential memory.  Proto-episodic memory could 
hardly develop from a form of memory capacity that had no re-experiential format at 
all.  Indeed there is no compelling reason why toddlers, at least, should not credited 
with proto-episodic recollection. As Bauer (2013) points out, the phenomenon of 
infantile amnesia has encouraged us to think that “adults lacked memories from early 
in life because children failed to create them.” (ibid, p. 515).  
The question then becomes how one might employ a WWW procedure with 
children much younger than 2-and-a-half.  What is surely inadvisable is the use of 
arbitrary temporal orders, given the difficulty that younger children have with them 
(Bauer, Hertsgaard, & Wewerka, 1995).  One suggestion from securely within the 
present theoretical position is to use simultaneity rather than order as the When 
element (Section 1 of the Introduction). As discussed, this has already been done 
within the rat literature (Eacott and Norman, 2004), given that Which-context (the 
background of the cage in this case) is something simultaneously present with the 
spatial and semantic elements.  Moreover, as noted, Newcombe, Balcomb, Ferrara, 
Hansen, and Koski  (2014) have employed this What-Where-Which design with a 
search task in very young children.  If indeed What-Where-Which is really What-
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Where-When(simultaneity), then we have a procedure that might be used with 
toddlers or even infants. In the two studies mentioned, simultaneity was also a spatial 
fact; but it need not be so. For example, simultaneity could be the co-occurrence of an 
object in a location with an auditory cue or some coloured illumination. This is a kind 
of temporal content worth exploring developmentally via deferred imitation in young 
children.  It may reveal undreamed-of capacities. 
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Appendix 
The elemental model assumes that recall of location and recall of icon (i.e., 
recalling that different ones must be moved each time) are independent of one another 
and that recall of location order given recall of location is independent of icon, that 
recall of icon order given recall of icon is independent of location and that location 
order given location is independent of action order given action. If we know the 
probability of getting location correct P(L), the probability of getting location order 
correct given location P(LO/L), the probability of getting icon correct P(I) and the 
probability of getting icon order correct given icon P(IO/I) then we can calculate an 
expected distribution of scores from 0-4 using the following equations. 
The expected probability of scoring 0 is the product of the probability of 
getting location incorrect and the probability of getting icon incorrect (using the same 
one twice). It is given by the following equation: (1-P(L)).(1-P(I)). 
The expected probability of scoring 1 is equal to the probability of getting 
location correct, location order incorrect and icon incorrect added to the probability of 
getting icon correct, icon order incorrect and location incorrect. It is given by the 
following equation: (P(L). (1 - P(LO/L). (1 - P(I)) + (P(I). (1 - P(IO/I). (1 - P(L)). 
The expected probability of scoring 2 points is equal to the probability of 
getting location and location order correct but getting icon incorrect, added to the 
probability of getting icon and icon order correct but getting location incorrect added 
to the probability of getting location correct and icon correct but getting location order 
incorrect and icon order incorrect. It is given by the following equation: (P(L). 
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P(LO/L). (1 - P(I)) + (P(I). P(IO/I). (1 - P(L)) + (P(L). P(I). (1 - P(LO/L). (1 - 
P(IO/I)). 
The expected probability of scoring 3 points is equal to the probability of 
getting location and icon correct and getting location order correct but getting icon 
order incorrect added to the probability of getting location and icon correct and 
getting location order incorrect but getting icon order correct. It is given by the 
following equation: (P(L). P(I). P(LO/L). (1 - P(IO/I)) + (P(L). P(I). (1 - P(LO/L). 
(P(IO/I)). 
Finally, the expected probability of scoring 4 points is equal to the probability 
of getting location correct and icon correct and location order correct and icon order 
correct. It is given by the following equation: P(L). P(I). P(LO/L). P(IO/I). 
  
 
 
 
